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As a matter of strategy, the attorney can radically trim the
size of his or her case by relying on a single theory of the case
at trial. The theory becomes the litmus test for deciding whether
to include an item of evidence in your case-ill-chief. The test for
admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 is logical relevance to the facts of the consequence at trial, primarily the
facts alleged in the final pleadings. If counsel uses Rule 401 as
the litmus test, as in McMartin, the case could drag on for
months. With the client's consent, counsel should focus on the
strongest theory and have the discipline (and confidence) to offer only evidence that contributes to the development of that

theory. Of course, counsel should not forget about, or dispose
of, the information pertinent to other theories. The trial may
take unexpected turns, and counsel needs to flexibly adapt to
the actual developments at trial. Evidence that was not used for
the case-in-chief may become handy rebuttal evidence.
Even implementing that strategy, however, is not enough.
In a complicated case, there might be scores of witnesses and
thousands of documents with information relevant to the theory. Frorn a tactical viewpoint, counsel must be discriminating.
If the advocate has done a good job selecting a theory, many of
its elements will be formally or virtually undisputed, and counsel should avoid boring the jury by overkill. Although ideally
counsel ought to offer a single item of evidence to prove up
those elements, as a practical matter, it may be necessary to offer some cumulative testimony. If, for example, counsel calls a
witness to establish one element, it might become clear to the
jury during the course of the testimony that the witness also
has personal knowledge of facts pertinent to another element.
In that event, if counsel does not elicit the witness's testimony
about the latter element, the jury may become suspicious. For
that matter, the opposing attorney may invite the jury to draw
an adverse inference.
Moreover, counsel will want to include some corroboration
in the case-in-chief on the linchpin element of counsel's theory.
Even on that element, however, counsel should not offer every
available item of evidence. To achieve simplicity at trial, counsel must select the "best" items of evidence.
Even if,for some reason, counsel decides to be less drastic
in paring down the case, counsel should be ready to prioritize
the evidence. The judge, either pretrial or during trial, may decide to "move the case along" and demand that counsel limit
the number of witnesses or exhibits. Counsel must be prepared
for the unexpected, even to the point of jettisoning evidence
originally slated for presentation. On short notice, counsel may
have to decide which evidence is expendable and which is the
best that must be retained in the case-in-chief.
But what does the "best" mean in this context? Some attorneys resolve that question and choose their items of evidence in
an intuitive, almost haphazard, maunner. There are some empirical investigations of the relative weight that jurors attach to various types of evidence. This article proposes several generalizations as to which types of evidence the litigator should ordinarily
prefer and include in the case-in-chief. We realize full well that
the reader will probably disagree with some of these generalizations. Yet, we offer them in the hope that this article will prompt
more litigators to familiarize themselves with the empirical literature, devote additional time to thinking about this question, and
make more deliberate selections of the trial evidence to proffer.
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pages of documents. During the discovery phase of another
federal suit, Washington Public Power Supply Systenm Securities
Litigation, 19 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 1994), the parties exchanged
more than 200 million pages of documents. In these types of
cases, it is not good trial advocacy to simply introduce at trial
all the information compiled during pretrial discovery. Even if
the jury consists of 12 Einsteins, the jurors cannot digest that
much information.
In the early 1990s, the American Bar Association Special
Committee on Jury Comprehension released the results of surveys of jurors who had participated in complex federal and
state cases. (Spec. Comm. on Jury Comprehension, ABA Litigation Section, JURY COMPREHENSION IN COMPLEX CASES
27-28, 31 (1990).) The researchers asked the jurors what complaints they had against the attorneys who had tried the cases.
By a wide margin, the primary complaint was that the litigators
went overboard and swamped the jury with information, particularly an excessive number of exhibits. Inthe infamous McMartin child abuse prosecution in California, prosecutors called
124 witnesses and introduced 974 exhibits, requiring more than
33 months of trial and consuming nearly 64,000 pages of transcript. (Don L. Benedictis, McMartin Preschool Lessons:
Abuse Case P/agued by Botched hvestigation, Too Many
Counts, 76 A.B.A. J. 28 (Apr. 1990).)

Keep it simple
At trial, the attorney must exorcise the demons of complexity and confusion. "[T]he key to winning is being able to simplify in a clear and powerful way. It's the single most important
thing to accomplish at trial." (Harry M. Reasoner, Juries Need
Guidance Without Condescension, NAT' I L.J., Feb. 3, 1992, at
S8.) How can the attorney reduce his or her case to manageable
proportions that the jury can easily digest? There are strategies
as well as tactics that should be employed.

Cal/fbrnia-Davis.David A. Schlueter isa law professor at St.
Mary's Universi o , School of Law in San Antonio, Tevas. He is also
a mnember of the editorial board/br Criminal Justice magazine.
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In deciding what evidence to pare from the case, counsel
should address the following question: Which types of evidence
are most likely to cany significant weight with the trier-of-fact?

There is no a priori answer. Although the Cuestionl is essentially
empirical, there have been only a IFew empirical studies, some
of which we cite here. We also draw on our limited experience
as litigators and our years as teachers of trial and evidence tactics. We do not pretend that all attorneys and judges agre with
our order of preference. A proponent of evidence. however.
cannot intelligently tackle the initial tactical qluestion unless he
or she makes some assuniptions about the relative weighl of'
various types of evidence.
Our assumption is that ill desceiding order, the lollowing
types of "evidence" are Most influiential With a jury:
* judicial notice by the trial judge (Fed. R.Evid. 201):
"admission by the party-opponent. either in the lorm of a
stipulation or in the form of an evidentiary admission (Fed. R.
Evid. 401, 801 );
" physical evidence (Fed. R. Evid. 901 -2. 1001-08):
" live testimony by a lay witness (Fed. R. Evid. 6(01-2.
701):
- live testimony by an expert witness (Fed. R.Evid.
702-6);
* documental , hearsay (Fed. R. Evid. 803-4, 901 -2.
1001-08): and
&noundocumentary hearsay (Fed. R. Evid. 803-4. 901).
The purLoses of this article are to explain this order ol preference and add some necessary caveats.

Judicial notice by the trial judge
When a trial judge agrees to judicially notice a proposition.
the end result is an ilstruction from the juCge. In many cases.
the judge tells the jury point blank to assume that a palicular
fact is tre or that a certain event occurred. On the do\vwiside. a
judicial instruction may be less dramatic than live testinioniy.
The instruction might be bland compared to the testimony of a
charismatic witness.
There are niaiy upsides to judicial notice, however. (Edward
J. Imwinkelried. PoUt-Daubert Notice, NTr' i Li.. Dec. 24.
2001. at B 1I.) First. it can save the proponent a substantial
amounilt of money. For example, if the judge agrees to judicially
notice a scientific proposition, it may obviate the prolonenits
need to call an expert to present live testiniony that could have
cost the client thousands of dollars. Second. judicial notice can
save trial time and radically simplify the proponent's presentation. Again. in substantial cases today, the primary devils the
proponent Ilust banish are complexity and confusion. While
live expert testimony about a proposition can consume several
hours. it might reCuLire only a ninute or two to read the july the
instruction on the judicially noticed fact. In our v'ie\'. simpler is
almost always better.
In mocderi trials, judicial notice is an attractive option. To
begin with.judicial notice is more readily available today. Although in the past, corrts anid commentators sometimes used

the shorthand expression "verifiable certainty" to describe the
standard for noticing scientific propositions, the governing
statutes. such as Federal Rule 201(b), do not incorporate the
ter1 "'certainty." Rather they typically announce a more relaxed standard: A proposition that is "capable of accurate and
ready cletermination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be qLuestioned" may be judicially noticed. In
Daubert. the U.S. Supreme CourI observed that "argLuably,
there are no certainties" even in hard science. (Daubert v. Me'cll Dow Pharmaceuticals, lc.. 509 U.S. 579 590 (1993).)
The Court acknowledged the realistic limits to scientific investigation. That acknowledgment should make trial judges even
more receptive to judicial notice requests.
Furthermore. the jury tends to attach great weight to the trial
judge's statements. Jurors are inclined to discount statements
by the "hired gun" attorneys. (Mark Dombroff. Jurl hsruclions
Car Be Crucial ini
Trial Process, LEGAt TINES, Feb. 25,
1985, at 26.) Ii contrast. jurors "typically listen more closely
and weigh more heavily almost everything said to them by the
judge." Both the coLirts and psychological researchers concur
that jurors are likely to assign special weight to ajudge's inistructiori becaLse juLrors view the judge as an impartial authority
figure. (United Stwe.s i Hickman. 592 F2d 931 (6th Cir. 1979)
("a trial judges position before ajLIy is 'overpowering.' His
position makes 'his slightest action of great weight with the
julry' ");Mark Dombroff, suprta Note, The Appearance ofJuslice: Jiulges' Verbal and Nonerbal Behavior in Criminal Jury
Trials, 38 SiTAN. L. RFv. 89, 150-5 1(1985) (research by Harvard psychologist Robei Rosenthal).)
AlthoLghi a judicial notice iistrurction rates at, or near. the
top of the order of prel'erence, case-specific factors can control.
Ii flederal practice, one lactor is whether the case is criminal or
civil. Ii a civil case, a judge may instruct the jurors that they
Must accept a judicially noticed proposition as conclusively established. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(g), however, the
judge may not deliver such an instruction in a criminal case. Il
a criminal trial. the juclge can tell the juLrors only that they
may-but iot must-accept the tr'uth of the noticed fact. Especially when the case is a criminal one, the proponent should
compare the personal ity of the judge with that of the witness
the proponent would otherwise call to prove Lip
the fact. If the
judlge has a forceful couL'tr'oom demeanor and is likely to deliver the iistr'uctioni in a powerful manner, ajudicial notice illstruiction might still be preferable. But ifthe judge has a less
coriirIianiding COUlrroii presence and the witness is particularly engaging, it would be wiser to present the live testimony.

Admission by a party-opponent
Most jurors know that ours is an adversary system of litigation, anid they consequently attach special weight to concessions by the party-opponent. For that reason. Louis Nizer made
it a practice to stress adrIIissionis Curirig sunmation; he eiiphasized that lie had proven his case "out of the mouths of Oul_
very
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adversaries." (Trial Preparation:An Interv4ew with Louis Ni7er,

2 TRIAL

DIPL.

J. 6, II (Spr. 1979).)

The admission can take the forn of a formal stipulation between the parties or a mere evidentiary admission, such as live
testimony about a statement made by the party-opponent. There
are downsides to choosing an admission, though. A stipulation
in particular might lack drama. Further, by accepting a stipulation tendered by the opponent, the proponent could lose the
right to present especially impressive testimony; the opponent
might be offering the stipulation only because he or she does
not want the jury to hear the testimony of a very credible witness. Finally, unless the opponent is willing to reduce the stipulation to writing before trial, the agreement to the stipulation
can unravel at trial; the parties might have a falling out over the
tenor of the agreed stipulation.
Nevertheless, at least when the opponent agrees to reduce
the stipulation to written form, stipulations afford the proponent many of the same advantages as judicial notice. Again, a
stipulation with the opponent can save the proponent both
money and time. Like ajudicial notice instruction, a stipulation or other admission can help the proponent simplify his or
her trial presentation. For that reason, unless the stipulation deprives the proponent of the opportunity to present especially
convincing testimony, the stipulation usually works to the proponent's advantage.

Physical evidence
When a judge takes judicial notice, the judge tells the jury to
accept a fact as proven. In an admission, the party-opponent
vouches for the fact. Failing judicial notice or an admission,
what are the proponent's alternatives?
One of the most potent alternative methods of establishing a
fact is to proffer physical evidence of the fact. Dean John Henry
Wigmore counseled litigators to proffer physical evidence. He
noted "the general mental tendency" of the trier of fact to accept "corporal object[s]" offered as evidence. (7 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EviDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW

§§ 2129-30 (Little. Brown

& Co. 3d ed., 1940).) In his experience, the jurors' very "sight
of the" object tends to "corroborat[e]" the testimony of the
sponsoring witness. (Id.) The jurors can see the corporeal evidence for themselves, and they trust their own observations
more than statements by either witnesses or trial attorneys.
Psychologists also believe that physical evidence carries
great weight during jury deliberations. In the short term, jurors
more readily understand information presented in sensory
form. Some studies indicate that while we gain only 10 percent
of our information about the external world exclusively
through the sense of hearing, we gather 85 percent of the data
from the sense of sight. (Peter Perlman, Preparationand Presentation of Medical Proof 2 TRIAL DiPL. J. 18 (Spr. 1979).) In
the long tenn, presenting corporeal proof of a fact helps the
jury remember the fact during deliberations. Some researchers
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have found that the long-term retention of information more
than doubles when a person can both hear and see the information. (Ronald Briggs, "Real and Demonstrative Evidence" 4
(unpublished manuscript on file with the National College of
District Attorneys, University of South Carolina Law
School.)You not only want to impress the jury when you introduce the evidence, but, more importantly, you also want the
exhibit to influence the jury deliberations, which might occur
days, weeks, or even months after the introduction of the evidence. To some extent, during closing you can refresh the
jury's memory of exhibits previously introduced; but it is best
if you strongly imprint the evidence into the jury's memory at
the time of its introduction. An item of physical evidence is especially likely to help the jury remember the testimony of the
sponsoring witness when the judge sends the exhibit into the
deliberation room. (United States i. Williams, 87 E3d 249. 255
(8th Cir. 1996).) The exhibit can then serve as a constant, visual reminder of the witness's testimony.
There is a wide variety of types of physical evidence. The
simplest and most powerful can be the display of an item of
original or historical physical evidence; for example, the actual
drugs or the actual knife. (Paul C. Giannelli, Chain of Custody
and the Handling a/'Real Evidence, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 527
(1983).) Or the proponent can ask the judge for permission to
display a demonstrative physical exhibit to the jury. Even if the
police cannot locate the knife allegedly brandished by a defendant, the judge can allow the prosecutor to use a similar
weapon to illustrate and dramatize the victim's testimony.
When the jury can visualize the victim's version of the events,
the jury is more likely to accept that version.
A demonstration is a step beyond a passive exhibition or display of an object. In a demonstration, the attorney shows the
jury a process in action. In one medical malpractice trial, a defendant doctor reenacted an appendectomy on a small platform
before the jurors. (Roger K. O'Reilly, Defending a Doctor
Against All Odds, 72 A.B.A. J. 44, 45 (Mar 1, 1986).)
Probably the rarest type of physical evidence is a jury view,
where the jury is transported to a site outside the courtroom to
view a relevant object or scene. In the O.J. Simpson prosecution, Judge Ito permitted the jurors to be escorted to the accused's residence to help them understand some of the more
complex testimony.
As the proponent moves from (1) the display of original evidence to (2) the display of demonstrative evidence to (3) an incourt demonstration and finally to (4) ajury view, the odds diminish that the judge will allow the proponent to resort to the
physical evidence. When an assault victim asks permission to
demonstrate the limited mobility of his or her arm, there is a
risk of feigning that simple displays do not pose. Judges are especially reluctant to grant requests for jury views. Depending
on the site to be visited, a view can be a logistical nightmare. If
the proponent has control of the object or site to be viewed, the
view must be carefully planned. The proponent should plan the
jurors' route to the view and ensure that the area has been

cleared. An unanticipated encounter during the view coulc trigger a mistrial. Even with the most careful planning. the unexpected can occur.
In the celebrated "Twiliglit Zone" manslaughter trial, prodlcer John Landis found himself clefending allegedly dangerOuS conditions in an outdoor Vietnam battle set vherc Vic
Morrow and two child actors were killed in a crashing helicopter. The jurors were taken to view the actual scene of the
accident. i the middle of the proceeding, a large helicopter
made an unexpected fly-by. The defense moved for a mistrial.
claiming that the unanticipated presence of the helicopter had
a powerful emotional effect on the jurors.
(Ashley S. Lipson. "Real" Real Evidence, 19 LITIGATION 29,
32 (Fall 1992).)

Live testimony by lay witness
As a general proposition, live testimony by a percipient witness or-dinarily is preferable to reliance on hearsay. There is a
substantial body of research indicating that in evaluating testimony, jurors tend to attach significant weight to cleneanor.
What researchers have discovered is that:
- IJ uries thouglt the child's in-coIrt statements were significantly more likely to be complete than the chilcl's beforecourt statements.
- J Juries ratecl the child's likelihood ofcor-ectly identifying the abuser in court as higher than the child's likelihood of
correctly identifying the abuser before court.
- [J juries rated the child's in-court statenents as more itnportant to their vote of gutilt or innocence in comparison to the
child's before pre-court statetnents.
(Gail S. Goodnan, John B. Myers, Allison Redlich, Lori P.
Prizrnich & Edward Iniwinkelried, Jintoi;s'Perceptionsof
Hearsay in Child Sextual Abuse Cases, 5 PSYCH., PUB. PO'Y &
LAw 388 (1999).) Juror-s respond to the confidence level displayed by live witnesses in their nonverbal detieanor. (Felice J.
Levine & June LoLin Tapp, The Psychology of CrhiinalIdenrification." The Gap fiom Wade to Ki-1/y, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079,
1081 (1973).) There is a growing body of data suggesting that,
in part because they know they are being denied relevant deneanor, jurors ascribe less weight to hearsay evidence.
(Richard F Rakos & Stephan Landsman, Researching the
Hearsay Rule. Emeui'ing Findings,General lsstmes, and Future
Directions. 76 MINN: L. REV. 655 (1992); Peter Miene, Roger
C. Park & Eugene Borgida, Ju-or Decision Making and the
Evaluation ofHearsay Evidence, 76 M INN. L. REv. 683 (1992);
Margaret Bull Kovera. Roger C. Park & Steven D. Penrod, Atos PeirceptionsqfEvewimess and HearsayEvidence, 76
MINN. L. RE\V. 703 (1992).)
A further advantage of live testimlony is that it gives the proponent more flexibility at trial. When there is ati unforeseen de-

velopment at trial, the proponent cali consult with the witness
and make appropriate adaptations oi redirect or during rebuttal.
Adaptation may be impossible when the source of the inforniation is ali unavailable hearsay declarant.

Live testimony by expert witness
Just as the proponent should prefer live lay testimony to
hearsay, we also believe that live lay testimony is preferable to
live expert testimony. Our assulptionl is that simpler is better. It
is easier for thejury to understand the testimony by a percipient
lay witness, ancl the jurors can niore readily identify with a fellow layperson.
Our view is probably at odds with the conventional wisdoii.
In the past 20 years, the use of expert testimony has skyrocketed. As recently as 1974, the Ju-v Verdict Reporter fbr Cook
County, Illinois, listed only 188 regularly testifying experts. As
one commentator noted, "It loclay, there are more than 3,100, a
1,540% increase." (Andrew Blun, Evlperts: How GoodAre
They?, NAi't L.J., July 24, 1989, at 1.) In part. that increase has
been fueled by a widespreacl belief ationg litigators that expert
testimony inipresses lay jurors. We are skeptical of that belief.
Many litigators too quickly assuiie that ati "expert" is required.
To be sure, there are cases when the proponent must resort
to expert testimony. In a legal or medical malpractice case, for
example, the law usually requtires the proponent to present expert testimony to make out a pritia facie case. Or there simply
may not have been any eyewitnesses to the crucial event. Absent the benefit of direct testimony, the jury may need the assistance of a pathologist or accident reconstructionist to connect
the clots of the circutnstantial evidence. In all these cases, the
proponent has no choice but to proffer expert testitiony to get
to the jury.
In many cases, howeve, the proponent has a choice. When
there is a choice, we recomiend that the proponent initially
present only the lay witness and hold the corroborating expert
testimony in reserve for rebuttal. Admittedly, appellate courts
often assert that jurors assign great. even inordinate, weight to
expert evidence. (Edward J. hinwinkelried. The Standard fbr
Admitting Scientific Evidence." A Critiquefi'om the Perspective
qf Juovr PsYchology, 28 VILL. L. RExv. 554, 562-63 (1983) (collecting cases fion California, the District of Columbia, and
Maryland).) Although there has been little empirical investigation of this question, the finclings in most of the available studies are at odds with the courts' ipse dixit assertions. (Anthony
Z. Roisman, Sur-viving the Daubert Attack: Staving Focused, 14
Tiie PRAcrICA LITIGATOR 43, 48 (Nov. 2003) ("there is a
wealth of empirical evidence which directly refute Ithe]
premise" that lay jurors are incomipetent to critically evaluate
expert testiiony).) In one study involving sound spectrography or voiceprint evidence, the researchers found that the conviction rate dipped when prosecutors proffered the expert testimony. (Henry F. Greene, Voicel-int Identification: The Case in
Favor ofAdinssibiliry, 13 Ait. CRIM. L. REv. 171. 173-89
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(1975).) In another study conducted by Dr. Elizabeth Loftus,
nock jurors were more willing to convict on the basis of an
identification by seemingly confident eyewitnesses than on the
basis of fingerprint evidence. (Elizabeth Loftus, Psychological
Aspects of Courtroom Testimony, 347 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI.
27, 32-33 (1980).) After canvassing the studies, two commentators concluded that "It]he image of a spellbound jury mesmerized by ... a forensic expert is more likely to reflect... [judicialI fantasies than the... realities of courtroom testimony."
(Richard Rogers & Charles Patrick Ewing, Ultimate Opinion
Proscriptions: A Cosmetic Fiv and a Plea ftr Empiricism, 13
LAW & Hum. BEIHAv 357, 363 (1989).)

When Kumho Tire Co. v.Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)
was pending before the Supreme Court, several eminent researchers filed an amicus brief setting out an excellent collection of the empirical research. (BRIEFAMICi CURIAE OF NEIL
VIDMAR, RICHARD 0. LEMPERT, SHARI SEIDMAN DIAMOND, VA-

ILERIE P HANS, STEPHAN LANDSMAN, ROBERT MACCOUN,
JOSEPH SANDERS, HARMON M. HOSCH, SAUL KASSIN, MARC
GALANTER, THEODORL EISENBERG, STEPHEN DANIELS, EDITH
GREENE, JOANNE MARTIN, STEVEN PENROD, JAMES RICHARDSON, LAITY HEUER, AND IRWIN HOROWrTr

IN SUPPoi~r OF RF-

No. 97-1709.)
The brief concludes that the available data do not bear out the
frequent assertion that jLries "quickly defer to experts (suspending their critical judgment) .... "(Id. at 4.) In the words of the
SPONDENTS, KUMHO TIRE Co. v. CARMICHAEL,

brief, "none of the studies indicates that jurors ... just defer to

expert testimony." (Id. at 18.)
In light of these studies, when a lay percipient witness has a
confident demeanor and no seeming stake in the outcome of the
case, counsel should seriously consider relying on the lay testimony rather than expert evidence. The choice might differ if the
expert were extraordinarily well qualified or charismatic. In the
typical case, however, the proponent should stress the lay testimony at least in the case-in-chief. Counsel can take a minimalist approach to expert testimony and seize "the high ground" of
the lay testimony, which the jurors can easily grasp. (Roger
Rook, Take the High Ground: A Practical Approach to Meeting
the hIsanity Defe.nse, PROSECUTOR'S DESKBOOK 598 (Nat'l Dist.
Attys. Ass'n 1971).)

Documentary hearsay
There are times when documentary hearsay is preferable to
live testimony. For example, presenting live testimony might be
too expensive:
In an absolute sense, the fee for [an] expert's personal appearance might be too high. In a relative sense, other, more
critical items of evidence might be so expensive to prepare
that there would be insufficient funds [left! to pay for live expel testimony.
(Edward J. Ihmwinkelried, Presenting Scienti/ic Evidence ill
Hearsay Form, 32 CRIM. L. BULL. 187 (Mar. Apr. 1996).)
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Or the witness might have a teiTible demeanor. The proponent's
pretrial contacts with the witness could lead the proponent to
conclude that the witness has poor eye contact, hesitates before
every answer, or has a nervous habit of wiping his brow. Or, the
witness may be too combative on cross-examination:
The jury may attach more weight to a written report than
to the witness's live testimony. Offering the ... evidence in
hearsay form would inforni the jurors of the helpful, substantive content of the [testimony] without exposing the jurors to
the [obnoxious nonverbal conduct that might lead them to
discount the Itestimonyl.
(ld. at 187-88.)
The witness's impeachability could furnish another reason
for preferring the presentation of the witness's information in
hearsay form. It is true that under Rule 806, the opponent can
impeach a hearsay declarant. (Matthew Faber, Legal Backbiting: The Life and Times of'Evidence Rule 806, 17 THE CHAMPION 4 (Sept./Oct. 1993).) As a practical matter, though, opposing
attorneys frequently neglect to offer evidence to impeach
hearsay declarants. Realistically, by presenting the evidence in
hearsay form, the attorney reduces the likelihood that the jury
will ever learn of the facts impeaching the witness's credibility.
Finally, the proponent might fear that on cross-examination
of the live witness, the opponent could elicit facts damaging the
proponent's theoiy of the case. If the opposition wants to adduce the additional facts that strengthen its case, it will have to
call the person as a witness. This might be risky. The net effect
of offering the evidence in hearsay form is that the jury learns
the facts favoring the proponent's theory without being exposed
to the facts undercutting the theory.

Nondocumentary hearsay
If the jurors can visualize information, the information is
more likely to register in their memories. (John E.B. Myers,
Alison D. Redlich, Gail S. Goodman, Lori P.Priznich & Edward Imswinkelhied, Jurors'Perceptions of Hearsay in Child
Sevual Abuse Cases, 5 PSYCH., PUB. PoL'Y & LAW 388
(1999).) The late Irving Younger urged attorneys to use documentary evidence, asserting that sonething reduced to writing tends to have an inherent credibility in the juror's eyes.
His urging makes sense in light of the research documenting
the importance of physical evidence. As noted above, in the
long term. the jurors are more likely to retain information
presented visually. Again, as an exhibit, a written document
can be sent to the jury room during deliberation. Counsel
should not assume, however, that every admitted exhibit can
be sent into the deliberation room. Under sone documentary
hearsay exceptions, the proponent may introduce the exhibit
and read it aloud to the jury, but is precluded from submitting
it to the jurors for their physical inspection. (See Fed. R.
Evid. 803(5), 28 U.S.C.A.)

Given a choice, a proponent ought to prefer documentary
hearsay rather than nondocunentary hearsay. If the choice is
between a business entry and an excited utterance, the proponent ordinarily should select the business entry. The same
preference extends to government and past recollection
recorded documents.

Reading & Research Resources
For more-in-depth analysis of the topics discussed in this
article, refer to the following resources:
Discovery
* 'Rule 34: Controlling the Paper Avalanche" by Michael A.
Pope in Litigationmagazine, volume 7,page 28, spring 1981.
- "Coordinating Complex Discovery" by Irwin J. Sugarman in Litigation magazine, volume 15, page 41, fall 1988.
-

Conclusion
A leading contemporary commentator on trial practice.
Professor James McElhaney, has stressed that one of the key
challenges facing a trial attorney is eliminating the "clutter"
from his or her case-in-chief. (James McElhaney, Clutter, 77
A.B.A. J. 73 (Mar. 199 1).)The upside of the broad scope of
modern pretrial discovery is that it enables the attorney to
better prepare for trial. However, the expanded scope of pretrial discovery is a two-edged sword. One of the major
downsides of the broad scope is that the attorney is tempted
to introduce at trial all the information that the attorney has
fought so hard to discover. To avoid overwhelming the jury,
the attorney must resist temptation. One strategic technique
to achieve simplicity is reliance on a single theory of the case
at trial. Even the use of that technique is not enough, however. As a matter of tactics, the attorney must go farther and exercise selectivity in choosing the very "best" evidence to present to the jury. And determining the best evidence requires
counsel to determine the preferred forms of evidence.
Hopefully, this article will encourage the reader to invest
more time thinking about the question of which types of evidence are "best." Of course. the generalizations have to yield
to case-specific. situational factors. Selectivity, however, is
so critical in a complex case that litigators cannot afford to
rely purely on rote or intuition to choose the iterns of trial
evidence. Empirical studies contain some helpful guidance.
and other guidance can arguably be gleaned from more informal experience. The only truth the jury knows is the old
story by our evidence, and we owe it to our clients to ensure
that we select the best evidence to tell the simplest, most
compelling story. E
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